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Introduction
In a previous article, I argued that a useful model for
understanding transactions in cyberspace is that of the gray market.'
A gray market involves the unauthorized distribution of a good and
has been studied extensively in the context of international trade
When an authorized dealer reimports goods, such as electronics or
pharmaceuticals, from a foreign market for distribution back into the
domestic market, the dealer is creating a gray market. In the context
of international trade, gray markets arise because of differences in
exchange rates, territorial differences in regulation and intellectual
property laws that create price differences, and territorial divisions in
retailing and distribution designed trademark and patent rights.3 The
key to gray marketing in international trade is unauthorized
distribution. My point in the earlier paper is that issues of intellectual
property infringement and ownership in Cyberspace are really
questions of unauthorized distribution and hence ones about gray
markets.'
Napster has proven my point. While Napster does facilitate the
copying of music, and while this copying has been found to be
infringement, Napster is different from the photocopier and the
videotape recorder, which also permit the reproduction of
copyrighted materials. Napster allows reproduction and distribution
simultaneously. In fact, the system of file sharing facilitated by
Napster provides an alternative to standard retailing models for the
distribution of music. Unlike the photocopier and the videotape
recorder, which were inputs that lowered the costs of copying,
Napster's perceived threat is in creating channels that allow
consumers to have access to music without relying on retail outlets,
radio stations, jukeboxes and other ways of accessing music.
Furthermore, Napster allows consumers to unbundle and rebundle
music. Music, as distributed through compact discs or through
broadcast media, are usually bundled with other content, whether "Bside" songs or the banter of a disc jockey and the badgering of
advertisement. Napster works like a jukebox that allows the user to

1.
2.
3.
4.

Shubha Ghosh, Gray Markets in Cyberspace, 7 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 1-56 (1999).
Id. at 7-9.
Id. at 15-20.
Id. at 20-27.
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listen to single tracks. But Napster is also better than a jukebox in
allowing users to readily create new mixes or bundles of songs. The
rebundling capabilities of Napster facilitates the practice of
remastering or creating favorite mix tapes, something we have all
done, and will continue to do. New products can be created and
distributed with ease on a massive scale that is unprecedented. It is
not just copying that is at issue, but a new distribution network.
Copyright law in many ways is inadequate to handle the Napster
problem, especially under current conceptions of copyright as a grant
of exclusive property right to the copyright owner to prevent access
and to fashion the manner in which copyrighted content is developed
and marketed. Napster, as we all know, has been enjoined and the
Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") is searching
for a way to protect its copyrighted songs from being distributed
online. In response, users seek to circumvent the RIAA's shield in
clever ways like altering the titles of the songs being distributed.
Copyright law cannot fully protect the RIAA, because what is at issue
is not simply copying but alternative distribution mechanisms for the
transfer of songs, a mechanism that is particularly powerful and
desirable for end users. Furthermore, copyright law cannot fully
protect the RIAA because copyrights should not be used to prevent
distribution mechanisms like Napster. Copyright law has always
struck a balance between the right of access and the right to exclude.
Ownership of a copyright does not create an absolute property right
against the public. Instead, ownership has been subject to public
access based on recognized permitted uses and fair use. The position
in Napster that copyright is an absolute right ignores the important
role that Napster plays in creating an alternative distribution
mechanism that is creative, innovative, and economically valuable.
Copyright law, of course, gives the copyright owner. the right to
control the public distribution of the copyrighted work. This right is
subject to the first sale doctrine, which means that the copyright
owner cannot control the distribution of the work after the first sale.
The first sale doctrine permits the development of the used book
market or the resale market for most copyrighted material. The
Supreme Court has recently held that the first sale doctrine even
applies to sales of the copyrighted work made overseas.' This means
that if the copyright owner sells a work overseas, the overseas buyer
can resell the work domestically without infringing the owner's
copyright. Effectively, the first sale doctrine does not prohibit the
5.

Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'Anza Research, Intl., Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
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gray market in copyrighted works through international trade.
The question is whether the first sale doctrine would apply to
transactions like those facilitated by Napster which result in the
creation of a gray market in Cyberspace. The RIAA contends that
even if a Napster user has legitimately purchased a compact disc, the
user does not have the right to make copies of songs for mass
distribution. The infringement is not in the distribution or the sharing,
but in the copying, which is not protected by the first sale doctrine.
This argument prevailed in the Ninth Circuit opinion, but ignores the
problem that in a digital environment copying and distribution merge.
Consequently, file sharing involves a combination of legitimate
distribution and illegitimate copying, and the two cannot be
separated. The relevant inquiry should be on file sharing as a
protected use or fair use of copyrighted material, and Napster's role
in facilitating file sharing. But analyzing file sharing requires
understanding its proper treatment under copyright law as either noninfringing or fair use. The proper treatment of Napster mandates
recognizing its role in creating gray markets which facilitate
competition and benefit consumers.
I develop my analysis of Napster in three parts. Section II
analyzes the economics of intellectual property. Intellectual property
should be designed to allow the recovery of fixed costs in a way that
recognizes the public goods nature of intellectual property and the
resulting problems in exclusion. Gray markets are the predicted
outcome of any intellectual property system, and their existence must
be recognized in creating an intellectual property system. Section III
applies my economic analysis to Napster as an alternative mechanism
for the distribution of music. I begin the section by recognizing that
the court's analysis diverges from my prescription. Section IV
addresses this divergence by pointing out that even if courts, like the
Ninth Circuit in Napster, privatize intellectual property and give
intellectual property owners nearly absolute rights against all uses of
works protected by intellectual property, then the response of owners
of file sharing systems like Napster is to privatize their economic
interests through intellectual property law. This can occur, I suggest,
through obtaining business method patent protection for file sharing
systems. Such protection, I conclude, would give creators of file
sharing systems a proprietary interest and the requisite bargaining
power in dealing with owners of copyright in content like the RIAA.
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I
The Economics of Intellectual Property:
Fixed Costs, Public Goods, and Gray Markets
There are two poles to the debate over the protection of
intellectual property, the strong protection position and the open
access position.6 Advocates of the strong protection position contend
that the creation of intellectual property would be undermined unless
the creator has complete and nearly absolute control over the uses,
distribution, and marketing of her intellectual property. Absent such
control, less intellectual property would be produced. At the other
extreme are those who advocate open access since intellectual
property is an important input for the creation of new works and
involves expression that is important for the development of the
marketplace for ideas. This position would advocate very weak or
non-existent intellectual property rights because of democratic and
communitarian values.
Each of these positions has some support in the economics
literature, but each ignores important economic and legal conclusions
from the other side. The production of intellectual property is
expensive and involves large fixed costs.7 No one would expend such
costs unless there was some guarantee of a reasonable return on the
investment. Normally such a return would be earned by selling the
item produced in the marketplace. The problem with items protected
by intellectual property is that the costs of production entail very high
fixed costs and low variable costs. Consequently, the marginal costs of
production will be low. Since a competitive market will tend to drive
prices down to marginal costs, prices in a competitive market will be
driven to a point where it may not be possible to cover fixed costs,
and the enterprise will be unprofitable. This classic fixed cost problem
affects many large scale industries, such as railroads and utilities, and
provides the rationale for regulating such industries The degree of
regulation has been controversial, stemming from direct price
regulation to government creation and management of high fixed
costs industries. Intellectual property provides another means of
resolving the fixed cost problem by giving the creator a strong
6. For an excellent historic and economic account of this debate, see Gillian K.
Hadfield, The Economics of Copyright: A Historical Perspective, 38 Copyright Law
Symposium 1, 33-45 (1992).
7. Jean Tirole, The Theory of IndustrialOrganization 307-08 (M.I.T. Press 1988).
8. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law 1836-1937 308-22
(Harvard U. Press 1991) (describing the fixed cost controversy).
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monopoly right in the creation to free the creator from the forces of
competition that would otherwise make the enterprise unprofitable.
However, intellectual property demonstrates not only the fixed
cost problem, but also the public goods problem. A public good is one
that is non-rival and non-excludable, meaning that consumption can
be shared by a large group of individuals without depleting the good's
supply.9 Ordinary consumer goods, such as cars and food, are rival
and excludable. A fixed stock of these consumer goods will be
depleted as consumers use the goods and sharing is only minimally
possible. Public goods, such as music, movies, news, and information,
can be used by a potentially infinite number of consumers without
diminishing the amount of entertainment and information. Some
public goods exhibit congestion costs, the costs associated with too
many people using the good. An example of this outside the area of
intellectual property is provided by a public swimming pool. Many
people can share its use, but too many people raises the costs of using
the pool by increasing congestion. Such costs also arise in the context
of intellectual property use. For example, trademarks are public
goods, but if the trademark becomes overused it loses its value as an
indicator of source and quality. Too much use imposes the equivalent
of congestion costs that diminish the value of the good.
The public goods quality of intellectual property is captured by
the now clich6, "Information wants to be free." A corollary of this
clich6 is that information should be free since attempts to curb its use
through price or other mechanisms would be futile. Information is
non-rival and non-excludable, according to this argument, and
therefore should be made open for all to use. The problem with this
argument is that it ignores the costs in producing information."
Economic theory does not state that if a good is public, then it should
be free. Instead, economic theory suggests that such goods cannot be
provided through a market mechanism. Either the government
provides public goods (such as roads and national defense), or the
government subsidizes the market to provide these goods. In
addition, economists recognize the role for non-market and nongovernmental institutions, such as non-profit entities, in providing

9. Richard Comes & Todd Sandier, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and
Club Goods 10-13 (2d ed., Cambridge U. Press 1996).
10. John Seely Brown & Paul Duguid, The Social Life of Information 65-66
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Press 2000).
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public goods." The problem posed by public goods for economists and
lawyers is determining what set of institutions should be adopted to
produce and provide public goods in an economically rational and
effective manner.
Before discussing how intellectual property law addresses both
the fixed cost problem and the public goods problem, and how these
problems result in the development of gray markets, let me describe
how economists would propose resolving the public goods problem.
One way, as discussed before, is to have the government supply the
public good financed by general tax revenues." The problem with this
scheme is establishing a tax structure that is both fair and efficient. A
flat tax structure would result in some people paying more than their
value for the good, and some less. The unfairness of this is obvious,
especially for those who must pay for something they do not value.
The scheme is also inefficient because of the separation of payment
from individual valuation. An alternative is to use a system of user
fees that allows consumers to pay for the amount of the public good
used. Toll roads and fees for entry into parks are examples of such
user fees. The problem is that this system would work for some public
goods, such as roads and parks, but not for others, such as national
defense. Furthermore, determining the appropriate user fee structure
imposes a cost on government that again must be borne somehow.
Privatization is another possible economic solution to the
problem of public goods creation and provision. Private firms could
compete in the creation and provision of public goods, and the firms
could develop the appropriate payment structure to cover their costs
and guarantee a return. The problem is that private provision of a
public good may be inefficient because of the free rider problem. If
one firm provides the public good, then there is little incentive for
another firm to do so, especially since public goods are non-rival and
non-excludable by definition. Therefore, competition will not likely
survive in private markets for public goods. Furthermore, pricing
must be modified to deal with the sale of public goods. In markets for
ordinary consumer goods, firms charge the same price for goods of a
given quality and quantity. Setting such a price structure for public
goods would cause the same problem as financing public goods
through taxes: some will pay more and some will pay less than their
valuation of the public good.

11.
Kenneth Arrow, The Limits of Organization21-23 (Norton 1974).
12. For an overview of how public goods are provided, see Dennis Mueller, Public
Choice H 17-25 (rev. ed., Cambridge U. Press 1989).
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The solution is to allow firms to price discriminate. Just as
governments can set user fees, firms should be allowed to price
discriminate in the pricing of public goods so that consumers pay
according to their valuation of the good. Ideally, each consumer will
be charged exactly the amount they value the good, and the firm will
obtain enough revenue to recoup the costs and earn a return. This
arrangement is known as perfect price discrimination, and economists
recognize that perfect price discrimination is efficient. 3 The problem
is the costs of a system of price setting tailored to the individual
consumer, and the potential that discriminatory pricing may not be
4
perfect and may result in inefficiencies arising from market power."
The last economic solution is to have joint production and
provision of public goods by both private and governmental entities.
Education is a public good that is provided through this mechanism in
almost all countries. Such a system has the costs of the governmental
and private arrangements described above, but also has one clear
benefit: the potential for competition between public and private
entities. Even though the competition may be limited (there may be
only one private entity and only one public entity), the mixed scheme
provides choices that the separate arrangements do not.
Intellectual property law resolves the fixed cost and public goods
problems by granting a limited right of exclusion to the creator of
intellectual property." The right of exclusion gives the creator some
monopoly power to recoup the fixed costs of investment without
being subjected to the destructive forces of competition. The
limitation of these rights, through such provisions as time duration,
fair use, and permitted use, protects the public goods aspect of
intellectual property. The law, however, creates a baseline against
which market and business forces work to produce and distribute
intellectual property. The limited right to exclude gives the owner of
intellectual property leeway in how to fashion the marketing of
intellectual property. Intellectual property law provides a mixed
governmental-market solution to the creation and distribution of
public goods such as information.

13. Louis Philips, The Economics of Price Discrimination 12-16 (Cambridge U.
Press 1983).
14. For an excellent critique of the theory of price discrimination as applied to
copyright, see Julie Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1799 (2000).
15. Dennis Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern IndustrialOrganization 502-05 (3d
ed., Addison-Wesley Longman 1999).
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Technological and social methods of exclusion serve to
complement the legal methods. Territorial restrictions, retailing, and
the packaging of products permits the owner of intellectual property
to further privatize the protected work and permits the owner to
extract value from the consumer. Territorial restrictions are imposed,
for example, in franchising or through restrictions on where and to
whom intellectual property protected goods can be sold. These
restrictions further limit competition and allow the intellectual
property owner to extract more for the creation. Retailing goes hand
in hand with territorial restrictions and creates another layer in the
distribution of intellectual property. That creates added value
through the provision of service and generation of advertising, and
also permits the intellectual property owner to extract value for the
work. Finally, packaging serves as an advertising function and as a
means of bundling products, such as music, which allows the owner of
intellectual property to sell and extract value for her creation. These
extra-legal mechanisms permit the intellectual property owner to
recoup fixed costs and provide the incentives to create and distribute
public goods.
But exclusion mechanisms are imperfect, especially where public
goods are concerned. Territorial restrictions, regulated largely by
contract between the manufacturer and the distributor, can be
bypassed. Alternative distribution mechanisms to retailing, such as
resale by private consumers, can be created post-sale. Goods can be
unpackaged and repackaged as consumers play songs for friends and
create their own mixes. The exclusive right to exclude can give the
intellectual property owner only limited control over the range of
business and social practices that facilitate the distribution of nonrival and non-excludable goods. It is on this point that the clich6 of
information wanting to be free actually rings true: owners of
intellectual property cannot feasibly control all dimensions of its
dissemination. Gray markets, or alternate distribution mechanisms,
arise to fill in the gaps in the distribution channels created by
intellectual property owners.
Of course, the response by intellectual property owners has been
to close the gray markets through the one tool that is potentially
successful - legal regulation. But the "law of the gray market"
reflects checkered and largely unsuccessful attempts to restrict the
gray market." I discuss this body of law elsewhere, but summarize
here the main legal tools intellectual property owners have used to
16.

Ghosh, supra n. 1, at 29-39.
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prevent the gray market. Trade restrictions have been of mixed
success because of the authority given to customs office agents in
determining what gets in and what does not. Claims for trademark
infringement have been of mixed success since the trademarked
goods do actually originate from the trademark owner, but only
through a different distribution mechanism. Copyright law has little
weight because of the first sale doctrine. Patent law offers the
strongest support for restricting the gray market because of the strong
rights granted under patent law of exclusive distribution rights in the
entire United States. But patent law applies to a narrow set of
intellectual property, namely novel, non-obvious, and useful
inventions," and hence serves as a tool for only a few industries, such
as pharmaceuticals. But even for those industries, Congressional
legislation potentially limits patent law's power to allow
reimportation of certain drugs, a policy whose status is currently
under ongoing debate. Gray markets cannot be so easily closed or
regulated.
The situation is aggravated in a digital environment where
copying is cheap and content manipulation and distribution is so easy.
The recent battles over MP3, Napster, e-books, and DECCS reflect
battles to control alternative distribution mechanisms through
copyright law. The point of this section has been to show how these
battles reflect the economics of fixed costs and public good
production that are at the heart of intellectual property. The
exclusion mechanisms of intellectual property and business practices
lead inevitably to gray markets as alternative mechanisms of
distribution. In the next section, I focus on Napster and build a
foundation for legal analysis on the economic foundations laid here.
II
Napster, File-sharing, and the Distribution of Music
The issue with Napster is the vicarious and contributory liability
of the file sharing service for the infringing activities of its users. For
the purposes of this paper, I put off until the end of this section the
questions of knowledge and facilitation that the claims of vicarious
and contributory liability raise, and focus on the narrow question of
whether the file-sharing which occurred among Napster's users is
copyright infringement. If file-sharing is not copyright infringement,
17.

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
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then of course Napster would not be liable either vicariously or
contributorily.
File-sharing was found to be copyright infringement by both the
district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.'8 By uploading MP3 versions of songs and transferring them
to other users, file-sharing constitutes both an infringement of the
copyright owner's exclusive right "to reproduce the copyrighted
works in copies or phonorecords" under section 106(1) and the right
"to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending"
under section 106(3)."9 The users would have two potential defenses.
One is under the first sale doctrine that limits the ability of the
copyright owner to control distribution after she has made the first
sale to the user. While this might serve as a defense to the
infringement of the distribution right, the first sale defense is not a
defense to the infringement of reproduction right. To justify the
reproduction of songs, the users would have to rely on the defense of
fair use.
The fair use defense under section 107 provides a multi-factor
balancing test to determine whether the infringing use would be
justified. The four factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the
use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) quantity of the
copyrighted work taken, and (4) the effect on the potential market for
the copyrighted work."0 In analyzing the fair use factors, the Ninth
Circuit found that all four factors weighed against a finding of fair
use.' The appeals court's analysis of the fourth factor is the most
interesting.
Quoting language from the district court's opinion, the Ninth
Circuit found two sources of harm to the potential market for the
copyrighted work: (1) reduction in sales of audio CDs among college
students and (2) increase in the barriers to the copyright owner's
"entry into the market for the digital downloading of music."' The
first finding rested on estimating the number of CDs that would have
been purchased in the absence of file-sharing through Napster, a
quantity that depended on the "assumption that every download on
Napster would roughly correspond to a lost CD sale.
18. See A&M Rec., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243 (N.D. Cal. May
5, 2000); A&M Rec., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001).
20.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001).
21.
A&M Rec., Inc., 239 F.3d at 1014-19.
22. Id. at 1017.
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The second conclusion is more revealing. The harm imposed by
Napster is not simply that of lost sales in existing markets, but
imposing impediments that prevent competition by members of the
RIAA in the digital download market. As the district court found
(and the Ninth Circuit endorses):
[R]ecord company plaintiffs have already expended
considerable funds and effort to commence Internet sales
and licensing for digital downloads. Having digital
downloads available for free on the Napster system
necessarily harms the copyright holders' attempts to charge
for the same downloads."
Napster, according to this explanation, prevents the recording
companies from recouping their fixed costs and from investing in the
Internet market. This analysis begs a deeper question: is the purpose
of copyright law to protect this type of investment of fixed costs?
Copyright law is designed "to promote the progress of the science and
the useful arts"2 by giving the copyright owner a monopoly of limited
duration to exploit the work commercially. While this might mean
that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to exploit all
commercial uses of the copyrighted work, this does not give the
copyright owner rights of entry in all markets. What is disturbing
about the district court's analysis is that the term "barriers to entry,"25
suggesting that Napster is engaging in anti-competitive conduct. The
irony of this description is that the copyright limits competition by
preventing entry. What if, for example, Napster did obtain licenses
for all the songs that are part of its file-sharing arrangement but was
able to charge a lower price for the downloading because of
advantages it had in the downloading and file-sharing technologies?
The price advantage offered by Napster certainly would not be a
barrier to entry. Analogously, it is odd to characterize free
downloading as anti-competitive.
Perhaps at the heart of the market analysis is the fact that
Napster does not incur the fixed costs in producing and creating the
songs, and therefore that its mechanism for distribution is cheaper
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Napster,239 F.3d at 1017.
Id.
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575

precisely because it does not have to pay artists, sound engineers, and
retailers. This characterization of Napster's advantage is stronger and
closer to the purposes of copyright law than describing Napster's
activities as raising entry barriers. What this discussion raises is the
recognition that while Napster may facilitate piracy, it also has
created an alternative mechanism for the distribution of music. Shawn
Fanning, the creator of Napster, has been creative and
entrepreneurial. Where is his reward? The RIAA would insist that
even if he should be rewarded, it should not at the expense of
copyright owners. The difficulty with this position is that it is not clear
who should have the right to determine how songs are distributed, the
copyright owner of the songs or the person who creatively invents
new technologies for distribution. The conflict between two sets of
inventors is central to the Napster debate.
Copyright law, as currently interpreted, seems to strike the
balance in favor of copyright owners. The court in UMG Recordings
v. MP3.com, Inc.2" described the current state of copyright law well
when it addressed the same question of market effects under fair use:
Any allegedly positive impact of defendant's activities on
plaintiff's prior markets in no way frees defendant to usurp a
further market that directly derives from the reproduction
of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works. This would be so even if
the copyrightholder has not yet entered the new market in
issue, for a copyrightholder's "exclusive" rights derived from
the Constitution and the Copyright Act, include the right,
within broad limits, to curb the development of such a
derivative market by refusing to license a copyrighted work
or by doing so only on terms the copyright owner finds
acceptable.
Copyright law, according to this court, gives the copyright owner
the exclusive right of first entry into any market, existing or future,
for the copyrighted work.29 The court finds this right in the
Constitution and the Copyright Act.' Any infringement of this right
constitutes a negative impact on the market militating against fair use.
The legal analysis of the court is flawed in UMG Recordings. The
Napster court cites this exact language from UMG Recordings in its
analysis of the market effects under fair use. Consequently, the
27.
28.
29.
30.

92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id.
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reasoning of the Napster court is also flawed. Neither the Constitution
nor the Copyright Act gives the copyright owner an exclusive right of
first entry in all markets for the copyrighted work. The Constitution
allows Congress to secure "for limited times" to authors the
"exclusive right" in their works.' The duration of time, the breadth of
exclusivity, and the scope of the right has been the subject of
Congressional discretion as enacted into the Copyright Act, which in
its current incarnation gives to the copyright owner the exclusive right
"to distribute copies... of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by. rental, lease, or lending."3 The
distribution right is not written to cover all forms of distribution.
Furthermore, the right under section 106 is "subject to sections 107
through 122.""3 Section 107 is the fair use provision that is the subject
of the cited analysis in UMG Recordings and in Napster. The
language of section 106 makes it clear that it is fair use which qualifies
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.' The court's analysis in
UMG Recordings, as adopted by the Napster court, presumes that it is
the exclusive rights that qualify fair use when it equates infringement
of the distribution right under section 106(3) with the harm to
potential markets under section 107." The court's analysis is
questionable and prone to criticism.
But is it wrong? I think in one crucial respect the analysis is
wrong. The court fails to give credit to the creativity evidence by
Napster in developing new distribution mechanisms for music and
file-sharing. By giving the copyright owner the right of first entry into
all markets for the copyrighted work, the copyright owner, here the
RIAA, has the right to foreclose Napster and all markets for song
distribution. Not only is this anti-competitive, creating barriers to
entry of a different type, this strong right is also harmful to the
development of technology, new business models and mechanisms for
distribution.
The problem is one of how to give the creators of Napster and
other file-sharing methods their proper due under Copyright law. Fair
use may be one way; high standards for contributory and vicarious
infringement may be another. As for the first approach, one model is
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001).
Id.
See generally id.
UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1017.
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demonstrated by the Sony decision where the Supreme Court, split 54, recognized private home copying of broadcast programs as a fair
use under the Copyright Act.' The problem is that much of the
copying that occurs through Napster is not private and in-home.
Therefore, the holding of Sony would not directly apply. 7
However, the Court could find that file-sharing of the type in
Napster is fair use because it is a common practice that has not been
shown to cause actual harm to the Recording Industry. More broadly,
the Court could hold that non-commercial file-sharing of the form
that occurs through Napster is a protected form of infringement.
These were all possible avenues made impossible by the ruling that
the copyright owner has an exclusive right of first entry in all markets
for the copyrighted work.
Where fair use fails to provide a resolution, the standards for
contributory and vicarious infringement offer some hope. The Ninth
Circuit in Napster attempted to fashion standards for vicarious and
contributory infringement that were similar in spirit to the rules for
Internet Service Providers under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act. The court affirmed the district court's holding that Napster "by
its conduct, knowingly encourages and assists the infringement of
plaintiffs' copyrights.' '3 The court also affirmed the ruling that
Napster was vicariously liable because it financially benefited from
the service and it supervised and controlled the service. However, it
is in the injunctive remedy that the court offers a ray of hope for filesharing supporters. Instead of shutting down Napster, the court
allowed it to continue but with stringent requirements of supervision
and prevention of copyright infringement.' ° As discussed before, this
remedy has set off another round of technological response as users
work around the new mechanisms of supervision. The gray market
opened by file-sharing and facilitated by Napster cannot be so readily
stopped or monitored.
I asked previously whether the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Napster was wrong, and I have suggested problems with it, traceable
back to the UMG Recordings decision. An equally compelling
question is: Does the result matter? I do not think there was ever a
real possibility that Napster would vanish like the eight-track or the
Beta video recorder. Even if the district court had mandated Napster
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Sony Corp. of Am. v. UniversalCity Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Cf.id.
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021-22.
Id. at 1023.
Id.at 1029.
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to shut down members of the recording industry would have followed
Bertelsmann's footsteps and purchased the service, reviving it."x In
fact, even if Napster had won, it is very likely that Napster would
have merged with members of the recording industry anyway. The
situation exemplifies what is known as the invariance principle, an
implication of the Coase Theorem.42 Under this principle, whenever
there is a conflict in rights over property, it does not matter who is
assigned the right in order to have the economically most valuable
result to arise. The invariance principle is recognized to be true when
transactions costs for negotiation are low and the parties negotiating
are sophisticated.43 In the case of Napster, Shawn Fanning and the
recording companies are sophisticated and the transactions costs, I
would predict, are low. Consequently, the Napster decision does not
matter: Napster would have vertically integrated with the recording
companies in the end.
If the Napster case does not matter, then why have I gone on so?
While the invariance principle does not matter for economic
efficiency, it matters for distribution of returns. If Napster had won,
Shawn Fanning would have been in a strong bargaining position and
been able to extract a larger return from the recording companies as
part of their bargain. The opposite, however, will be true. As the loser
in the dispute, Shawn Fanning loses bargaining position in the
negotiations with the recording companies. He loses control over his
creation and monetary rewards from its exploitation. While the end
result may not matter for users of Napster, there is a question of
whether the creator of Napster is receiving adequate compensation
for his creation.
There are equally compelling concerns about the distributional
effects on the users of Napster. Napster controlled by the RIAA
would offer different content and means of control than Napster in its
pre-injunction form. The risks of collecting private information about
users, limitations of the repertoire of songs available, and restrictions
on the use of the repertoire are all raised by an RIAA controlled peer

41. Richard Stenger, Study: FlatFuture for DigitalMusic <http://www.cnn.com/2001/
TECHlinternet/08/30/digital.music/index.html> (acccessed Mar. 26, 2001); Chris Nuttall,
Napster Loses Users, Cred <http://europe.cnn.com/2001/BUSINESS/O6/O6/napster/
index.html> (accessed Mar. 26, 2001).
42. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & Econ. 1, 1-44 (1960).
43. Robert Cooter, The Coase Theorem in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of
Economics 457-460 (J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, eds. 1989).
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to peer service. I would argue these concerns over content and
architecture are what is at stake in the Napster case and in future
cases against similar online services.
The Napster case failed to recognize the creative efforts of Shawn
Fanning and protect him through copyright law. As a gray marketer,
perhaps he should not be rewarded. His return is at the expense of
copyright owners, the true creators. But who can doubt that Shawn
Fanning has released one original and powerful use of the Internet? If
copyright law does not have the solution for creators of file-sharing
services, then perhaps another branch of intellectual property will.
III
Business Method Patents for File-Sharing Services:
The Strategic Response to the Napster Decision
The Napster decision indicates that courts recognize strong
property rights of copyright owners, especially in the use of digital
technology. Fair use and other limitations on these rights appear to be
weakened. The tide may change with the composition of federal
courts, but such changes are glacial. One response for creators of
services like Napster is to seek strong property rights for their
creations. While copyright law may not offer help, patent law does
through business method patents. To increase his bargaining position,
Shawn Fanning should have protected Napster through patent law
before publicizing it. This lesson can be learned by other creators of
file-sharing mechanisms and distribution systems on the Internet.
A. What are Business Method Patents?
In 1998, the Federal Circuit in a case called State Street Bank &
Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.," put to rest the business
method exception, under which patents could not be granted in
methods and processes of conducting business transactions, such as
systems of accounting or investment strategies.' The status of the
business method exception has always been murky. In putting to rest
the exception, the Federal Circuit was not overruling a case, or
invalidating a statute or legislative rule." Instead, the court was
quashing a perception among intellectual property practitioners that
44.
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
45. Id. at 1376.
46. Id. ("Even the case frequently cited as establishing the business method
exception to statutory subject matter, ... did not rely on the exception to strike the
patent.").
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the PTO would not protect business methods and any patents that
might be granted would not be upheld by the courts. After the State
Street decision, it is clear that there is no exception from the patent
laws for business methods in the United States. 7
The business method exception is often traced back to the
Second Circuit's decision in Hotel Security Checking Company v.
Lorraine Company, which dealt with the validity of a patent for a
"method and means for cash-registering and account-checking"
devised by a hotel manager to balance. accounts in his restaurant.4'
The scheme was designed to detect cheating by waiters and cashiers
who might skim off the hotel's revenues, or as stated in the claim,
"the peculation of waiters, cashiers or other employees.119 The patent
owner's system used color-coded and numbered tickets to keep track
of orders and payments." The system involved recording the orders
and price in duplicate to permit tracing and matching at the end of
the business day. 1 The court invalidated the patent on the grounds
that it lacked novelty and invention. 2 The court accepted evidence
that the system was predated and preempted by the prior art,
specifically a patent granted to another hotel owner for a system of
monitoring payment and orders involving cards to keep track of
orders and payment that were punched as the waiters filled orders. 3
The Federal Circuit in State Street is absolutely correct in stating that
the Second Circuit did not rely on a business method exception to
invalidate the patent.' Instead, the Second Circuit relied on
traditional patent law principles. But the Second Circuit did state that
"[a] system of transacting business disconnected from the means for
carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal interpretation
of the term, an art."' 5 Since the purpose of patent law is to stimulate
innovation in the useful arts, a "system of transacting business" could

47. Id. at 1377 ("Whether the claims are directed to subject matter within Section
101 should not turn on whether the claimed subject matter does 'business' instead of
something else.").
48. 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
49. Id. at 468.
50. Id. at 468-69.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 472.
53. Id. at 471.
54. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1376.
55. 160 F. at 469.
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not be patentable subject matter." This dicta has been the basis for
the business method exception.
Despite this language and the culture that recognized a business
method exception, the PTO granted business method patents and no
court invalidated them after Hotel Security Checking. Professor Josh
Lerner reports 445 patents for financial business methods from the
years 1971-2000, issued by the PTO." This history reflects, according
to some commentators, the inefficiency of the patent examination
process. To others, the history reflects a not-so-subtle overruling of
Hotel Security by the PTO. -Interestingly, no private party ever
challenged business method patents in the agency or in the courts
under the exception, which suggests that industry also benefited from
ignoring the exception. The Federal Circuit's decision in State Street
cleared the air on the issue, and although there were many business
'method patents prior to that decision, the numbers have exploded
since. Professor Lerner reports that 88 patents have been granted on
business methods in 1998 and 145 in 1999.8 According to the Wall
Street Journal, "Merrill Lynch has 24 patents, American Express has
22, Chase Manhattan has nine and Citigroup has 60."' Many business
method patents affect the ordinary consumer as well as the
sophisticated business person. A financial instrument that serves as an
investment vehicle to save for college was the subject of a business
method patent and also at issue in a seminal 1999 Supreme Court case
involving Eleventh Amendment immunity and patent and trademark
infringement. '
The patent at issue in State Street was called a "Data Processing
System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration" and was
a process for analyzing and manipulating financial data for the
purposes of administering a mutual fund."1 The original patent claims
consisted of six method claims and six machine claims.' The first six
covered methods of collecting and administering financial
information and were invalidated. '36 The second six were granted and
56.
57.
Paper).
58.

Id. at 472.
Lerner, Where Does State Street Lead? (Harvard Business School Discussion
Id.

59. Aaron Lucchetti, Patent Poses Problem for Amex Exchange-Traded Funds,Wall
St. J. C1 (Sept. 20, 2000).
60. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999).
61.
149 F.3d at 1370.
62. Id. at 1371.
63. Id.
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are what is referred to as "means-plus-functions" claims.' In other
words, the protected claims directed some piece of hardware to
function and produce some sort of result. This machine aspect of the
patent claims is important because of the connection between
business method patents and protection for computer software and
mathematical algorithms. The Federal Circuit, after reversing the
lower court on the business method exception issue, remanded the
case to the lower court to analyze the validity of the patent in light of
traditional principles." The case was settled after the denial of the
certioripetition, and the patent still exists."
Business method patents have served as a strategic tool in ecommerce. Amazon.com is the ,most salient example. In 1999, the
PTO granted a patent to Amazon.com for a "Method and System for
Placing a Purchase Order Via a Communications Network."6' The
patent included 26 claims, all of which were method claims for how an
individual client is permitted to communicate through a network
browser to a central server. A few weeks after the patent was granted,
Amazon.com sought and won a preliminary injunction against
Barnesandnoble.com to stop its use of a similar method in its Express
Lane ordering feature.' In granting the injunction, the federal district
court in Washington expressly considered the public interest in
enjoining Barnesandnoble.com and concluded: "Protection of
intellectual property rights in innovations will foster greater
' Whether greater competition and
competition and innovation."69
protection of innovations are compatible goals is the unaddressed
issue.
The strategic role of business method patents is illustrated by a
recent suit filed by the American Stock Exchange against Mopex, a
company formed by two investors that has a patent in an "[o]pen-end
mutual-fund securitization process."" The process is described as a
"'closed end fund of funds' and linked derivative securities, which
synthetically replicate the statistical relationship of the defined
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1377.
66. Id.
67. Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 (W.D. Wash.
1999).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1249.
70. Issued as patent number 5,806,048 subject to continuation patent number
6,088,685.
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individual or group of open end mutual funds."' American Express
seeks to invalidate the patent that allegedly overlaps with the
Exchange's low cost index portfolio that trades throughout the day,
unlike traditional mutual funds which trade less frequently. Some
view the Exchange as being held hostage to the patent, and while
there is a good chance that the patent will be invalidated, there is the
issue of how the patent is used and why it may have been obtained
initially.
B.

Strategic Intellectual Property and Business Method Patents
Economic and business historian Alfred Chandler likens patent
protection to tariffs to provide an explanation for why "some firms
became large and why some industries concentrated and others did
not." 3 According to Professor Chandler:
Patents had a greater effect than tariffs. The products of
many of the large industrials were new and protected by
patents in the American market. ... Manufacturers paid

close and continuing attention to protecting their products,
processes and specialized production machinery with
patents. ...

[Patents] provided only temporary protection

on individual products or processes. Moreover, one
manufacturer rarely controlled all the patents in his
industry. Singer Sewing Machine Company, for example,
was one of twenty-four firms employing the Howe patents.
... Its monopoly came from the effectiveness of its global

organization. A set of patents without such an organization
could never assure dominance; an organization, even
without patents, could.
As early as the 1890s some of the new integrated industrial
enterprises began to shift from relying on patents for even
temporary protection to depending on the output of their
specialized research departments to help maintain their
dominant positions.
The lesson is that products, not patents, create growth and
business strength. But perhaps this lesson is too facile when the
product is information. If companies are in the business of creating,
processing, and selling information, then patent law and intellectual
71.
Id.
72. Lucchetti, supra n. 59, at 118.
73. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in
American Business 374 (Belknap Press 1977).
74. Id.
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property law provide protection to both processes as well as their
output. In the Napster case, copyright law has served the role of
protecting the recording industry from the new distribution
mechanism created by Napster. Patent law, appropriately applied,
may provide the antidote of countervailing market power to the uses
of copyright law. But the lesson to draw from Professor Chandler's
account of history is that while patent and copyright law aid in
determining what entity has control over an emerging market, choices
of management and organization will determine the success of peer to
peer services. But as discussed previously, choices on who owns and
who governs will influence the architecture and content of Napster.
Patent law would provide the appropriate bargaining power for
creators of peer to peer services post-Napster.
C.

Are File-Sharing Systems Patentable?

Patent protection is granted to any "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" that satisfies the
novelty and non-obviousness requirements of sections 102 and 103 of
the Patent Act.75 In addition, the patent applicant must meet the
requirements of section 112, which demands that the applicant
describe the invention with specificity "to enable any person skilled in
the art to which it pertains ... to make and use" the invention in "the
best mode contemplated -by the inventor of carrying out the
invention.""
Business methods would be protected as processes and would be
treated as any patent claim for a process. As stated by the Patent and
Trademark Office in the 1996 Examination Guidelines for Computer
Related Inventions: "Office personnel have had difficulty in properly
treating claims directed to methods of doing business. Claims should
not be categorized as methods of doing business. Instead such claims
should be treated like any other process claims."" In State Street, the
district court invalidated the patent because the claim for the hub and
spoke financial management system was so broad that it would
"foreclose virtually any computer-implemented accounting method
necessary to manage this type of financial structure."" The Federal
Circuit interpreted this as a proper analysis under section 102 or
75.
76.
77.
78.

35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103.
Id. at § 112.
149 F.3d at 1377.
Id.

2001]

TURNING GRAY INTO GREEN

section 103, but not section 101, which governs statutory subject
matter; it reversed the invalidation and remanded for clarification. 9
How business patents will be treated by the PTO and by the
courts is currently a matter of speculation. Some light, however, is
shed on the issue by the Federal Circuit's decision in the dispute
between Amazon.com and Barnesandnoble.com over the
patentability of Amazon.com's "single action ordering" patent, better
known as "one click." The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction, finding that Barnesandnoble.com
had satisfied its burden by demonstrating Amazon.com's unlikely
success in proving the validity of the patent.' By pointing to prior art
consisting of published articles written by business professors,
Internet marketing techniques used by retailers other than
Amazon.com, and a prior patent granted to Amazon.com,
Barnesandnoble.com was able to raise questions about the validity of
Amazon.com's patent." The Federal Circuit's decision is a good
illustration of the scrutiny that will very likely be applied to business
method patents and the extent to which prior art may prevent the
patentability of some business methods.
File-sharing systems will very likely be found patentable if they
are novel and non-obvious improvements on the prior art. A search
of computer science and business marketing literature will determine
to what extent many file-sharing systems have been disclosed by the
prior art. Although the details of prior art are crucial for determining
the appropriateness of patent protection, the option of business
method patents provides a strategic choice for creators of file-sharing
system in promoting the use of such systems and obtaining bargaining
power in a world of strong intellectual property rights and exclusive
rights of first entry into emerging markets, as defined by copyright
law.
IV
Privatizing Cyberspace and the Gray Market
Napster's threat -

and the threat of file-sharing generally -

is

the same threat posed by gray marketers: the creation of alternative
mechanisms of distribution that challenge existing business methods
and institutions. The recording industry, and other owners of
79.
80.
2001).
81.

Id. at 1375.
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 1359-60.
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copyrights in content, can claim victory in obtaining rulings that
establish, at some level, the copyright owners' exclusive right of first
entry in all markets for distributing their copyrighted works. Such a
right effectively allows the copyright owner to foreclose the gray
market, subject to the technological quandaries currently seen in the
Napster case. But this victory may be Pyrrhic if the case development
signals a broader trend in privatizing intellectual property. Creators
of file-sharing systems can turn to business method patents to gain
strong property rights that will provide bargaining strength in the ongoing battle for ownership and control over file-sharing systems.
I strongly encourage the use of business method patents by
innovators like Shawn Fanning, even though I am a believer in the
rights of access and weak intellectual property protection for
copyright owners. The immediate battle, however, is not over rights
of access, but over who will determine how new technologies and
markets for content distribution will develop. The trend of the law is
to vest this determination in the hands of copyright owners. Gray
marketers, inventors and creators of alternative distribution
mechanisms, need countervailing power in this battle. Where
copyright law fails to protect these interests, a combination of patent
law and private bargaining can provide the proper remedy instead.
Ironically, rights of access in the future may depend upon recognizing
strong property rights, vested in the proper hands, today.

